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Take any textbook on Chinese history issued by the People's Republic of China 
for the enlightenment of foreigners: it features Genghis Khan as the sovereign of 
a "Chinese minority" who dominated China for a relatively short while and 
brought with them nothing less than chaos. As a rule any general history of Chi-
na, whether published during the Republican era or later, sees the period of 
Mongol domination as a kind of hiatus in the course of Chinese history. More-
over, a period of time as short as possible is granted to it: as the first mark of pre-
judice against it, its beginning is almost invariably set between 1277 and 1279, 
which was the time of the final collapse of the southern Song dynasty. This fails 
to take into account the fact that the Chinggisids began to rule the region of Bei-
jing in 1215 before finally dominating the whole of northern China in 1234, after 
the fall of the Jiirchen Jin dynasty. If they reigned for less than one century over 
southern China, they nevertheless had control of northern China for about a cen-
tury and a half. 
If we try to characterize the peculiarities of the Mongolian administration in 
China, we find the importance of military management during the first steps of 
their domination, and in the long term the overlapping of military and civilian 
functions. An example is the case of the very important post of the darughachi, 
"one who impresses the seal", a key institution at both the regional and local lev-
els.1 The ethnic variety of the military establishment is surprising, being filled not 
only with Mongols but also with a great number of foreigners and even of Chi-
nese. From an administrative point of view, another specificity was the piling up 
of multiple hierarchical and geographical levels of governmental units, which en-
couraged a trend towards decentralization. 
* Many thanks to Mrs Ann. Eastell who kindly polished my English text. 
1 The central role of the darughachi / daruyaci under Mongol rule is the subject of Eliza-
beth Endicott-West, Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration in the Yuan Dynasty, 
Cambridge MA 1989. 
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Among the diverse institutions typical of the pre-Yuan and Yuan periods, I 
have chosen to concentrate on two. One presents a distinctively nomadic over-
tone - a system of infeudation in northern China which is unique in the history of 
China. The second is definitely Chinese in its purpose - the provincial adminis-
trative and judiciary surveillance system. Here I give the content of my talk at the 
Cairo conference, while a more detailed treatment of the subject, with full refer-
ences, can be found in a future issue of Acta Orientalia.2 
The system of enfeoffment 
We do not need to insist on the fact that all the countries conquered by the armies 
of Genghis Khan were supposed to be the Grand Khan's personal possessions, 
which he could allot freely to his near relatives in shares called qubi: at that time 
the subjugated peoples were nothing more than slaves pertaining to the holder of 
this gift. Before long, however, it occurred that one of the dominated countries 
was a part of China. At that time the advisers of the conqueror of northern China, 
Muqali, happened to be Chinese warlords, referred to by the generic term of 
shihou and the main counsellor of the Grand Khan Ogodei was a famous si-
nicized Khitan, Yelii Chucai (1189-1243). From that time on, the nature of infeu-
dation changed under Chinese influence: the system adopted was called the 
touxia (fx or S IT) , a term designating the fief as well as its holder. In the form we 
are concerned with here, it was put into practice in northern China by Ogodei, 
mainly in 1236, for providing income to members of his family and to meritorious 
servants of the khan or their offspring, and organizing a nucleus of administra-
tion over the peasants of the Great Plain. Its implementation was prepared by a 
census of the population in the conquered Chinese territories, which was directed 
in 1236 by Shigi-Qutuqu (ca. 1180-ca. 1260), an adopted son of Borte, Genghis 
Khan's first wife. 
An appanage touxia was made up of Chinese families living in a given district 
of northern China, the reward being not slaves, but a fixed tax imposed on the 
families. These families were called the wuhu sihu "Five-Household Silk 
Households", because five households were bound collectively to pay one pound 
of silk yarn to their lord, besides a tax to the central government. Each appanage 
was thus quoted as "so many Five-Household Silk Households iri such district". 
So, for the first time in 1236, the Mongolian emperor took a definite district as the 
basis for a gift. Nevertheless the fiefs were not the land itself, but following Mon-
golian custom, a certain number of the population (households) living on it; and 
the compromise between Chinese and Mongolian habits is evident in the fact that 
these entrusted people were not slaves but payers of taxes. 
It seems that everything has been researched about this system and the chang-
es in its taxation experienced over the course of one hundred and thirty years. 
2 Besides an immense gratitude to our host, the Hungarian Cultural Counsellor in Cairo, 
Professor István Zimonyi, I wish to express all my thanks to the editors of Chronica and 




But the case remains worthy of examination in the context of the meeting of Chi-
nese and Mongolian political traditions in the thirteenth century. Thanks to the 
"Economic Treatise of the Yuan History", we have a list of all the appanages -
that is an allocation of certain taxes - granted to one hundred and fifty-four fami-
ly branches during the Mongolian rule in China. The name quoted is the name of 
the founder of the branch whose close kinship with the Grand Khan or his ser-
vices were the cause of the gift and who was supposed to benefit in his lifetime or, 
more often, after his death from the imperial liberalities - in each generation a 
son appears as his father's representative, so that sometimes it is difficult to know 
who was the real beneficiary by 1236. If we consider the distribution in 1236 and 
take into account only the appanages significant for their size, we find twenty-
five grandees whose grant of a touxia ranges from eighty thousand households to 
a little more than nine thousand. 
A subject of contention at the time of the census was the definition of a house-
hold. The Mongol point of view was that every male adult - over fifteen years -
was supposed to be the head of a household. However, Yelii Chucai demonstrat-
ed to Ogodei that in China several generations lived under the same roof, in such 
a way that one household ought to include all the inhabitants of a house: that was 
a way to reduce the burden of tax on the peasants; and he was listened to. But 
although the counsellor explained the benefit of administrative centralization, 
Ogodei adamantly maintained his requirement of independence for the fief hold-
ers. Later on, the fight between them and the government began when Qubilai 
tried to impose centralization in the Chinese way, but it amounted to virtually 
nothing: the holders of large appanages remained, at least until the end of the 
dynasty, lords in their domain. 
The list of the beneficiaries of touxia and the amount of their share also give an 
insight into the factual history of the Chinggisids during the first decades of the 
thirteenth century. The questions are: who received what, and why? For example, 
an interesting case is supplied by the most significant allotment, eighty thousand 
households in Zhending lu (in Hebei), which was given, according to the 
"Economic Treatise of the Yuan History", to Ariq-Boke. This piece of information 
is quite unexpected, as Ariq-Boke, a grandson of Genghis Khan and the younger 
brother of Qubilai - later his fierce enemy and rival from 1259 - is merely a neph-
ew of Ogodei, yet the fief is a very large one. Anyway, we know that he actually 
held a fief in Zhending lu under the reign of his older brother Mongke (1251-
1259). But in 1236, Ariq-Boke was no older than eighteen years at most and none 
of his brothers received anything at that time. The solution is supplied by the 
"Main Annals of the Yuan History": the beneficiary of the Zhending fief was the 
"Empress dowager", certainly the famous Sorqaqtani, the widow of Tolui, the 
mother of Mongke and Qubilai. Therefore, Ariq-Boke appears to have been in the 
privileged position of the youngest son linked to that of his widowed mother. To-
lui himself was the youngest son of Genghis Khan and Borte, and when he died 
in 1232 at the early age of about forty years, it was common knowledge among 
the Mongols that this death was a voluntary act on his part, to take the place of 
his brother the khan, threatened by the vengeful spirits of the defeated Jiirchen 
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Jin dynasty. Ogôdei, highly indebted to his sister-in-law, gave her all the appa-
nages of Tolui and in 1236 the most important fief in northern China. When she 
died in 1252, her fief was transmitted to her youngest son Ariq-Bôke in the nor-
mal way. The principle of ultimogeniture, often coupled with the widowed 
mother's power, was an important factor in the political and social history of the 
thirteenth century and remained deeply implanted in customary practices until 
the present day: this is a lesson taught by the first case of the 1236 list of touxia. 
And there are many others. 
The system of provincial and local administration and judiciary 
Let us turn now to the system of provincial and local administrative and judiciary 
surveillance which left its trace in the centuries following the collapse of the Yuan 
dynasty in 1368. Popular historians generally consider authoritarianism and des-
potism as the unavoidable result of Mongol domination, especially in Russia and 
China. For China the idea is that the significant strengthening of authoritarianism 
in the Ming and Qing eras was the outcome of the politics of administrative sur-
veillance enforced by the Yuan. What do the overabundant Chinese sources allow 
us to detect? 
As soon as Qubilai was elected Grand Khan under the guise of a Chinese em-
peror, he had the ambition, like any other founder of a Chinese dynasty, to emu-
late the administrative system of the Tang and Song; but, as had been usual in the 
course of two millennia, the formal names and titles handed from one dynasty to 
another hid different realities. Under the guidance of his Chinese or sinicized 
counsellors, in 1268 Qubilai instituted a Censorate, later with two detached pro-
vincial branches. One year later, to help to carry out the work at the provincial 
and local levels, he created the Regional Investigation Offices, first named the ti-
xing anchasi í § JpJ ££ ^ h], then in 1291 the suzheng lianfangsi 0 I B these 
offices are the object of the present reflection. 
There were twenty-two such offices, each responsible for a broad geographical 
region created for the purpose under the name of dao jfi ("the way", here a "cir-
cuit"). The major task officially assigned to the censorates and the regional offices 
dependent upon them was the denunciation of illegalities, essentially acts of 
bribery, corruption and exaction, in order to impede civil and military officials 
from plundering the people. They had, moreover, various duties of control and 
later they received as an extra charge the burden of the encouragement of agricul-
ture which encompassed not only the promotion of agriculture and sericulture, 
the planting of mulberry trees, the management of water resources, and the es-
tablishment of relief granaries for preventing famine, but also the good manage-
ment of the small local communities, the she ££ - a specificity of Yuan administra-
tion since Qubilai - where basic education in local schools was strongly advised. 
Also, in the balance, they must call for all the available talents and recommend to 
virtuous and scholarly men, especially in southern China after the fall of the 
Song. The name of the second generation of this institution, the suzheng lianfangsi, 
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entails the idea of respectability, rigour and probity which were expected from 
the employees of these offices, called "the eyes and the ears of the emperor". 
Who were these officials? Happily for historians, the Chinese literati were 
great producers and consumers of all kinds of biographies. Some decades ago, 
when I was researching the history of these Regional Investigation Offices, I col-
lected two hundred and eighty-one cases of persons, generally very distinguished, 
who at one time or another had filled a post in one of these offices. The break-
down of this number is interesting: one hundred and ninety-eight Chinese, that is 
more than two-thirds of the total, eighty-three non-Chinese, including thirty-four 
Mongols (so it would appear according to their name), seventeen Uyghurs, six-
teen Tangut Xixia, eight Central Asian Muslims, four Jiirchens, and two Khitans. 
Thus, the Mongols and their faithful non-Chinese helpers were present, but not 
overwhelmingly so. For many of them, Chinese as well as non-Chinese, their 
progress through a Regional Investigation Office was a stage in a brilliant career. 
Others, mainly Chinese, could spend their whole career in the field of the investi-
gation or related areas. Generally they were literati trained in Confucianism 
(which did not impede them from following a religious creed, essentially Bud-
dhism). 
If they were of foreign origin, very often they were descended from military 
servants at the time of the conquests, that is at the third or the fourth generation, 
and had themselves the opportunity of getting a Confucian education and, obvi-
ously, a certain command of the Chinese language. For the Confucianists, the 
teaching of virtue to civil and military servants and the promotion of a natural 
economy were self-evident duties. This idea of virtue also appealed to the Mon-
gols who until modern times have always loved moral precepts and advocated 
the virtues of loyalty and uprightness. The Xiaojing (#11, "Classic of the Filial Pi-
ety") - a compendium of basic moral principles for young Chinese - was, even 
before the Chinggisids, a manual popular in the steppes through its translations 
into Xianbi, Khitan, Jiirchen and Tangut. A Mongolian translation (in pre-
classical language) was published sometime in the thirteenth century or the be-
ginning of the fourteenth, and this text was used for the upbringing of the young 
imperial princes of each generation. 
I do not wish to give a rosy picture of the Chinggisid rule in China and pre-
sent that time as a paradise for human rights. We know that there were murders, 
suicides committed to escape political persecution, and imprisonment on false 
accusations. But these brutal illegalities did not interfere with the work of the 
censorial institutions: they were the fact of crude ambition at the upper level, es-
pecially in the financial field (the case of Ahmed is well known) and inside the 
imperial family. They were also the result of the permanent balancing act be-
tween preserving Mongolian traditions versus converting to Chinese ways of 
thinking and doing. We also know that from very early in their conquest of Chi-
na, Mongolian rulers were well aware of the financial advantages to be drawn 
from farmers: if peasants could produce more, they would pay more taxes. Any-
way, my argument is that, when creating a Censorate and the Regional Investiga-
tion Offices, Qubilai, who admired Chinese accomplishments and was aware of 
1 0 
T w o CASE STUDIES OF LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN CHINGGISID CHINA (YUAN ERA) 
the importance of personal merits, wished sincerely to improve the quality of life 
of his people. Contrary to the prejudice of historians unversed in the field of 
Mongolian studies, neither in the creation of these institutions nor in their func-
tioning can we discover hints of a forceful introduction of despotism. 
To strengthen my argument, I could summarize some conclusions on penal 
law in the Yuan era which I have already discussed elsewhere: the Mongolian 
penal law was based on principles and a spirit dramatically different from the 
Chinese ones and was certainly more humane. For example, basically it took into 
account the interest of the victim more than the benefit of the State. 
In conclusion, China in the thirteenth century and the first half of the four-
teenth century was indeed a constituent part of Inner Asia, taking from it as 
much as giving to it, and not as a dominant power. Its administrative and judicial 
institutions made up extraordinarily complex systems in such a way that it is im-
possible to characterize them from outside with some stereotyped sentences talk-
ing of despotism and dictatorship. The reality is much more subtle and unex-
pected and still awaits deeper exploration into the biographies and the collection 
of judicial cases to be better defined, and then the flexibility of nomadic culture 
will become more conspicuous. Concerning the Yuan legacy in Chinese society, I 
would like to remind the reader that the Muslim communities, so solidly estab-
lished all over China in modern times, had their roots planted under Mongolian 
rule in the Middle Ages. 
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